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Commentaries
The Obscenity Commission ReportAn Editor's Note
In October, 1967 Congress established an advisory commission (1) to
study the effect of obscenity upon the public, particularly minors, and
its relationship to crime and other antisocial behavior; and, (2) to
recommend legislative action necessary to regulate traffic in obscenity
without interfering with constitutional rights. During the fall of 1970
the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography issued its report. The
Commission majority recommended that legal restriction of obscene
books, pictorials, and motion pictures be totally abolished for adults
and that the restriction of obscene books be lifted for children. Such
a prescription for legal reform was largely based on conclusions the
Commission drew from its studies concerning the effects of obscenity.
To date legal periodicals have either ignored or refused to treat any
aspect of the Commission's work. Duquesne Law Review believes that
certain areas of the Commission's Report deserve responsible comment. Towards that end the editors have solicited professional opinion,
both pro and con, on its methodology and findings.
The primary area of inquiry treated in the first issue of the Review
concerns the work of the Effects Panel of the Commission. Questions
discussed are often factual, social scientific and philosophical rather
than purely legal. Some of the questions raised concerning the Commission's empirical research are as follows: Were the most relevant
criteria of effects employed? How valid were the measures of impact?
How much reliance can be placed on self report of responses to erotica?
How representative were the populations studied? Do statistical correlations provide a strong basis for inference? May certain areas of
inquiry be treated in terms of empirical research? Were the right kinds
of questions asked to determine public opinion? Were the right kinds of
effects studied in determining potential harm? Was the Commission
consistent in its interpretation of data? Did it overgeneralize? Did it
fail to explain apparent inconsistencies? Could it?
The importance of dissecting the Commission's empirical research
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for the legal community is twofold. First, light may be shed on the
wisdom of the Commission's legislative recommendation to abolish
existing controls on commercial sales and dissemination on obscenity.
Second, a deeper understanding of how to resolve questions of social
policy and law generated by the holding and philosophy of Stanley
v. Georgia' may be obtained.
Stanley, decided prior to the issuance of the Commission's Report,
held that the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime. The correlative right of adults to acquire
obscene materials also received express recognition. 2 Interesting questions arise from a logical extension of the court's basic holdings. If one
person has the right to read and procure obscene material, then some
other must have the right to disseminate it. Can the right to disseminate
such materials be any narrower than the right to receive and possess? If
so, are the latter rights effectively gutted?
It should be evident from the foregoing that the impact of the
Stanley decision cannot be arbitrarily confined to obscenity possession
cases. Certain evaluations and commitments made by the Supreme
Court in reaching its result have significance for the commercial distribution of erotic material. Since obscene speech is no longer per se
denied first amendment protection, the Court will have to take a
closer look at the nature and extent of the government's interest in
prohibiting sales in particular contexts. Four basic governmental goals
or interests have been advanced as standard justifications for restricting
the dissemination of obscenity: prevention of crimes of sexual violence,
protection of adults from moral depravity and corruption (or sometimes preservation of the moral and legal fabric of our society), prevention of exposure of children to such material, and prevention of
obtrusive, publicly offensive displays of obscene matter. The studies of
the Commission as to effects and public attitudes toward obscenity,
discussed on subsequent pages, constitute a source of information to
either buttress or refute a particular governmental interest. As such,
the authoritativeness of the Commission's work in a particular area (in
terms of methodology and findings) is of relevance to the legal community.
Although Stanley apparently rejected the above mentioned govern1. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
2. Id. at 564-65.

.Commentaries
ment interestss in preventing sex crimes or protecting people's minds as
sufficient justifications for obscenity censorship, certain points should
be noted. First, the court treated either issue in only summary fashion.
Second, the court left itself an "out" in both instances. In dealing with
the anti-social behavior argument it noted that given the present state
of knowledge, "There appears to be little empirical basis for that assertion."'4 It is reasonable to infer that a fuller consideration of the
issue could be obtained should such an empirical basis develop. Similarly in rejecting the right of the state to protect an individual's mind
from the effects of obscenity (in terms of controlling his private
thoughts) the court indicated a certain residuum of state power to
control public dissemination of ideas inimical to public morality. 5
Hence, unless one assumes a static attitude by the court towards issues
treated in summary fashion, debates concerning harmful short and
long term effects of obscenity are still relevant to the legal theorist or
practitioner.
Finally, the debate may have the immediate effect of giving courts
policy guidance in determining how far and how fast to extend the
Stanley principle. In this regard two cases currently before the Supreme
Court for decision should be noted. The first held that a statute prohibiting the selling, giving away, or possessing of obscene matter was
unconstitutional insofar as it made mere possession a crime. 6 In short
the case confined Stanley to its narrow holding, believing it had no
bearing on the regulation of sales of obscene materials. By contrast the
other case applied the Stanley privilege broadly to a public theater
(exhibiting a film assumed to be obscene) which controlled its advertising and admissions in a way that limited its audiences to consenting
adults. 7 The latter case would appear to extend the right to view obscene materials in an area one might term "privately public"; at the
same time it would seem to vindicate the right of commercial distribution under such conditions.
In making the sensitive determination of whether to extend Stanley
or confine it to its facts a court would do well to consider certain
3. Id. at 563-64.
4. Id. at 566.
5. Id.
6. Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex.), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 954
(1969).
7. Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S.
985 (1970).
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issues examined by the Report of the Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography.At the same time it should critically examine the authoritativeness of the Commission's pronouncements on those same issues.
Duquesne Law Review believes the commentaries which follow (in
this and subsequent issues) will aid a court greatly in such a task.

